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Contracts as regulation: the ISDA Master
Agreement
M. Konrad Borowicz*
This article proposes a rule of contractual interpretation for regulatory contracts defined
as contracts (i) used by a large number of market participants, (ii) subject to limitations
on deviation and (iii) designed with market problems (such as negative externalities) in
addition to transactional problems (such as transaction costs) in mind. The rule states
that the outcome of the interpretation of regulatory contracts must not be inconsistent
with the objectives of the regulatory framework applicable to the market in which the con-
tract is used. The article suggests that the reliance on that rule is normatively justified in
cases where the regulatory objectives are clearly defined and particularly when the alterna-
tive outcome is to void the contract or its provision. By adopting the regulatory rule for
contract interpretation, courts can preserve the autonomy of private regulatory regimes
created through contracts without sacrificing public policy objectives. Several examples of
Key points
 There are good legal and economic reasons for courts to enforce regulatory contracts per the plain
meaning of their terms as long as that meaning is not inconsistent with the objectives of the applicable
regulatory framework.
 However, when the plain meaning of a regulatory contract is inconsistent with those objectives, courts
should instead seek to align the contract’s meaning with those objectives through regulatory
interpretation.
 Regulatory interpretation of contracts must be based on clearly defined regulatory objectives and a
clear understanding of how a more conventional interpretation would undermine the achievement of
those objectives.
 While the regulatory interpretation of a contract reduces the flexibility afforded by the plain meaning
interpretation, it can ultimately increase the efficiency and safety of markets and benefit market
participants.
 It can also promote legal and market certainty in particular when the alternative is the invalidation of a
contract or its provision—an outcome that should be avoided given the legal and market uncertainty it
would create.
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the application of the rule to the interpretation of selected provisions of the ISDA Master
Agreement and the ISDA Credit Definitions are discussed.
1. Introduction
The master agreement (MA) developed by the International Swaps and Derivatives
Association (ISDA) is a standardized or boilerplate contract commonly used by partici-
pants in the $544 trillion1 over the counter (OTC) derivative securities market. The MA’s
influential role in this sizeable market helps explain why the MA has, over the years,
attracted a considerable amount of scholarly scrutiny in the literature on both contracts
and regulation. A cursory review of the literature on the MA reveals that the normative
evaluation of the economic effects of the MA by scholars of contracts and regulation was
different. Contract scholars identified various economic benefits of the MA, such as a re-
duction of transaction costs and various positive externalities. Positive externalities come
in two main forms: learning and network externalities.2 Learning externalities arise from a
historically established use of contracts and contribute to drafting efficiencies, reduced un-
certainty over the (judicial) meaning of contract terms, and familiarity with terms among
users. Network externalities arise from the widespread use of a contact form and tend to
boost some of the learning externalities identified above.
In contrast to contract scholars who zeroed in on the economic benefits, regulatory
scholars identified various problems with the MA and its influential role in the markets,
such as negative externalities. Negative externalities can be understood as costs suffered by
third parties as a result of transactions. Transactions governed by the MA could create
costs for third parties, such as increased systemic risk3 or created transactional precedents
that could affect market integrity.4 Such third-party effects would create apparent issues of
regulatory legitimacy of the MA.5
1 Bank for International Settlements, Statistical release: OTC derivatives statistics at end December 2018 (2019). This figure refers
to the notional amounts of OTC derivatives at end-December 2018. The market value of OTC derivatives at that time was $9.7 tril-
lion. The derivatives instruments covered by the statistical release include interest rate, foreign exchange, equity, commodities and
credit default swaps.
2 Marcel Kahan and Michael Klausner, ‘Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or “The Economics of
Boilerplate”)’ (1997) 83 Vanderbilt L Rev 713. Positive externalities are the focus of the following articles on the MA: S Choi and
M Gulati, ‘Contract as Statute’ (2006) 104 Michigan L Rev 1129; J Golden, ‘Interpreting ISDA terms: when Market Practice is
Relevant, as of when is it Relevant?’’ (2014) 9 CMLJ 299; H Collins, ‘Flipping Wreck: Lex Mercatoria on the Shoals of Ius Cogens’,
in S Grundmann, F Möslein and K Riesenhuber (eds), Contract Governance: Dimensions in Law and Interdisciplinary Research
(OUP 2015); D Awrey, ‘The Mechanisms of Derivatives Market Efficiency’ (2016) 91 NY Univ L Rev 1104.
3 J Biggins and C Scott, ‘Public–Private Relations in a Transnational Private Regulatory Regime: ISDA, the State and OTC
Derivatives Market Reform’ (2012) 13 Eur Bus Org LR 309 (‘[W]hile ISDA and its members are acting in their own interests in
seeking transposition of key private market norms, such norms may or may not always align with the interests of less well-
informed third-party stakeholders’).
4 GG Fletcher, ‘Engineered Credit Default Swaps: Innovative or Manipulative?’ (2019) 94 NY Univ L Rev 1073.
5 J Black and D Rouch, ‘The Development of the Global Markets as Rule-makers: Engagement and Legitimacy’ (2008) 2 L & Fin
Mar Rev 218. In my earlier article on ISDA, I have also examined the issue of legitimacy. I proposed a model of legitimacy consist-
ing of a combination of procedural standards applicable to ISDA itself as well as legislative, regulatory and judicial recognition of
the market conventions developed by ISDA. MK Borowicz, ‘Private Power and International Law: The International Swaps and
Derivatives Association’ (2015) 8 Eur J L Studies 66. In the current article, I seek to define more precisely the appropriate parame-
ters of judicial recognition by taking into account both economic and political-economy-related considerations.
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Regulatory scholars, like regulators, tend to look for risks in markets and contracts. The
professional focus of regulatory scholars can account for the difference in their normative
evaluation of the MA’s economic effects compared to contract scholars. But the difference
can also be accounted for at a more analytical level—contract scholars and scholars of
regulation focus on different units of analysis when examining the MA’s impact. Contract
scholars focus primarily on the economic impact of the MA on transactions, whereas regu-
latory scholars focus on the economic impact of the MA on markets. While markets can
be understood as aggregations of transactions, market problems, such as systemic risk or
market integrity, are different from transactional problems, such as transaction costs. The
MA addresses both types of problems and, in that respect, is a unique type of contract.
This article seeks to capture that uniqueness by identifying the MA’s regulatory properties
and examining their implications for adjudication of contracts with such properties.
The three elements of contracts identified in this article that are jointly constitutive of
their regulatory properties are as follows:
1. a large number of market participants uses the contract;
2. the users of the contract are constrained in their ability to deviate from it; and
3. the contract addresses market problems (such as negative externalities) besides trans-
actional problems (such as transaction costs).
Of course, it is unusual for a contract to address market problems by design because
contracts are designed primarily by lawyers. Lawyers are paid to optimize transactions,
not markets. There is no reason to doubt that the lawyers who conceived of the MA in the
1980s viewed it as an instrument addressing transactional problems, such as inconsisten-
cies across the different contract forms used by swaps dealers. However, that has changed
over time as MA grew to prominence in the market. Its design increasingly incorporated
regulatory elements, such as the various information obligations under the DoddFrank
Act.6 As Robert Pickel, the former CEO of ISDA noted in a series of articles published in
the Capital Markets Law Journal, the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) cemented the shift
from the transactional to a regulatory paradigm.7
Nevertheless, the normative implications of that shift remain unclear mainly because of
a lack of clarity over how courts (and other bodies) should interpret regulatory contracts
such as ISDA MA. There are good legal and economic reasons for courts to enforce regula-
tory contracts following the plain meaning of their terms as long as that meaning is not in-
consistent with the objectives of the applicable regulatory framework. However, I submit
that when the plain meaning of a regulatory contract is inconsistent with those objectives,
courts should instead seek to align the meaning of the contract with those objectives
through regulatory interpretation. Regulatory interpretation of contracts must be based
on clearly defined regulatory objectives and a clear understanding of how a more
6 ISDA August 2012 DF Protocol Agreement (13 August 2012) and ISDA March 2013 DF Protocol Agreement (22 March 2013).
7 RG Pickel, ‘Catastrophes, Punk Eek and Hopeful Monsters: a New Species of Financial Contract’ (2017) 12 (3) CMLJ 299;
‘Adapt or Die: Institutional Survival in the Post-crisis World’ (2018) 13 (2) CMLJ 169.
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conventional, plain meaning interpretation would undermine the achievement of those
objectives.
The recent saga of manufactured defaults is an excellent example of a situation in which
a lack of clarity over how courts (and other) bodies should interpret regulatory contracts
led to the creation of a regulatory gap and undermined the achievement of the objectives
of the regulatory framework applicable to OTC derivatives markets. Until recently, manu-
factured defaults were (and to some extent still are) technically allowed under ISDA’s
documentation. While ISDA has recently taken steps to address the problem, those steps
may prove insufficient because of a growing concern among regulators about the impact
of the practice of manufactured defaults on market integrity. As a result, courts may, in
the future, be faced with the question of whether the enforcement of terms undermining
OTC derivatives markets’ integrity is a desirable outcome from the point of view of public
policy.
To single-out the manufactured defaults sage is not to say that ISDA and the regulators
worked at cross-purposes on this or other matters. Over the years, essential complemen-
tarities have emerged between the objectives pursued by ISDA and those of public regula-
tors. The MA is published by ISDA and can be analysed in the context of ISDA’s
objectives, but those objectives often overlap with the objectives of public regulators. This
article’s claim is simply that the interpretation of regulatory contracts must occur against
the backdrop of the synergies or complementarities that can be achieved between private
and public regulation.
In this article, I examine the emergence of such complementarities between the ISDA
MA and the public regulation of OTC derivatives markets in the area of systemic risk and
market integrity. The examination suggests that while regulators are best positioned to fa-
cilitate the emergence of complementarities between private regulation through contract
and public regulation, courts can sometimes play a role in that respect.8 Courts can play
that role by ensuring that the plain meaning of a regulatory contract is not inconsistent
with the objective of the applicable regulatory framework. When the plain meaning of the
regulatory contract is inconsistent with those objectives, courts should seek to align the
contract’s meaning with those objectives through regulatory interpretation. I call this the
regulatory rule of contract interpretation.
The regulatory rule can be seen as a special case of the plain meaning or textual rule of
contractual interpretation identified by contract scholars as the most appropriate for fi-
nancial boilerplate.9 Contract scholars argue that the plain meaning rule is the most ap-
propriate for financial boilerplate because it helps courts to strike the right balance
between the competing normative considerations of party autonomy and legal certainty.10
8 For a similar argument in the context of contracts used in multilateral consumer markets, see RE Scott, ‘The Paradox of
Contracting in Markets’ (2020) 100 L & Contemp Problems. Scott argues that the use of contracts in multilateral markets calls for
the abandonment of the bilateral contract paradigm. He suggests contracts scholars should instead focus on ways that the state can
facilitate the formation of a regulatory network that improves the efficiency of standardized contract terms in multilateral markets.
9 Throughout this article I will use the terms ‘plain meaning interpretation’ and ‘textual interpretation’ interchangeably.
10 The literature referred to in (n 2) articulates that view.
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In this article, I argue that when a contract performs a regulatory function, the competing
normative considerations are different—they are the autonomy of the regulatory regime
established through the contract, on the one hand, and public policy, on the other. By bal-
ancing these considerations, the courts address an important issue of political economy,
namely who should regulate what and how.
In limited circumstances, courts may be well-positioned to address this issue and seek
to resolve it by adopting the regulator rule of contract interpretation. As suggested ear-
lier, the reliance on that rule is normatively justified in cases where the regulatory objec-
tives are clearly defined, and courts also have a clear understanding of how a more
conventional, plain meaning interpretation would undermine the achievement of those
objectives. While the adoption of the regulatory rule of contract interpretation will re-
duce the flexibility afforded by a plain meaning interpretation, it can ultimately increase
the efficiency and safety of markets and benefit market participants. It can also promote
legal certainty particularly when the alternative outcome is to void the contract or its
provision.
In the remainder of this article: Section 2 develops a conceptual account of the ISDA
MA as a regulatory contract by linking a description of the contractual architecture of
OTC derivatives markets with a discussion of the structural and functional features com-
monly associated with regulation; Section 3 discusses the evolution of the structural and
functional features of the ISDA MA; and Section 4 discusses examples of cases involving
the interpretation of the provision of the ISDA MA and the ISDA Credit Definitions
against the backdrop of the applicable regulatory framework.
2. Regulation through contract in OTC derivatives markets
The relational and regulatory dimension of financial boilerplate
Market participants who seek to enter into an OTC derivative trade for the first time com-
monly ‘execute an ISDA’. The ‘ISDA’ they have in mind is, of course, the ISDA MA.11
However, while the MA is the central element of the contractual architecture of OTC
derivatives markets designed by ISDA (the organization), it is only one of many elements
of that architecture. The other elements include (but are not limited to):
1. the Schedule;12
2. product definitions (such as the Credit Definitions (CDs)13) and confirmations;
3. credit support documentation;14 and
11 The latest version of the MA was published in 2002.
12 The Schedule amends the standard terms of the MA and this is what negotiators negotiate. This is usually divided into six
parts covering Termination Provisions; Tax Representations; Agreement to deliver Documents; Foreign Exchange Transactions
and Currency Options and other. P Harding, Mastering the ISDA Master Agreement (FT Press, 2010).
13 The first CDs describing credit default swaps appeared in 1999, have been amended in 2003 and, most recently in 2014.
14 The perception of increased counterparty risk prompted market participants to start collateralizing their transactions. To fa-
cilitate the process, ISDA developed credit support documents under both New York and English law, each reflecting the specific
features related to provision of security in the particular jurisdiction.













Legal scholars sometimes use the term ‘modular’ to refer to a contractual architecture
comprising a multiplicity of elements.15 In a modular contractual architecture, each elem-
ent of the architecture can be designed to perform a different function. For example, one
part may be designed to address legal risk and another part economic risks. The allocation
of different functions to different elements of the contractual architecture, allows the par-
ties to manage transactional complexity efficiently.
Consider two parties who want to enter into a credit default swap (CDS). The transac-
tion will be governed by the 2014 CDs, which, in turn, will be governed by the MA. The
lawyers for the parties can negotiate in the Schedule any desirable departures from the
MA’s pre-printed form. But they do not have to negotiate the MA from scratch. The same
MA can then be used by the parties to govern future CDS entered into between the parties.
Traders will only have to execute a confirmation incorporating the CDS, and there is no
risk that they will exceed their mandate by changing the legal terms of the deal.
We can immediately see that in ISDA’s case, modularity is a cost-effective response to
complexity.16 Market participants frequently enter into many highly customized OTC
derivatives trades, which raises the issue of identifying cost-effective ways of dealing with
the vast web of complex transactions. The cost-effectiveness of the contractual architecture
of OTC derivatives markets revolving around ISDA’s documentation helps explain why it
is so commonly relied on by market participants.
The structure of a regulatory contract
The crucial structural feature of the modularity of ISDA’s contracts is that certain ele-
ments of a modular contract are more difficult or costly to adapt than other elements. At a
basic level, we can distinguish between elements that can be adapted easily and elements
that cannot, at least not without the adaptation being considered ‘off-market’ and, there-
fore, costly to make. We can refer to the former as relational and the latter as regulatory
elements.
Confirmations, credit support documentation, and provisions of the MA that can be
modified through the Schedule are relational in the sense that they can be easily adapted.
In contrast, the provisions of the MA that cannot be easily modified through the
Schedule, CDs and the amendment protocols are regulatory in the sense that they cannot
be easily adapted.
Table 1 summarizes the elements of the contractual architecture of OTC derivatives
trades with relational (left column) and regulatory features (right column).
15 See HE Smith, ‘Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate and Information Flow’ (2006) 104 Michigan L Rev. 1175.
16 Anna Gelpern discusses the benefits, but also drawbacks of the modularity of the MA. ‘The modular form of ISDA’s contracts
may reinforce specialization in financial firms. Traders may never see the legal terms of a Master Agreement; however, they alone
may see transaction confirmations, which incorporate the Master by reference. Lawyers may have only limited exposure to the eco-
nomic terms. This compartmentalizes knowledge.’ A Gelpern, ‘Commentary’ (2009) 51 Arizona L Rev.
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The distinction between the relational and regulatory provisions is sometimes lost
when legal scholars refer to the MA using the generic term of ‘boilerplate’. Jeffrey Golden,
one of the authors of the early version of the MA, recently made that point in an article
published in the Capital Markets Law Journal and encouraged the use of the term ‘rela-
tional boilerplate’.17 The use of the term is meant to suggest that the parties can easily
adapt the MA within specific parameters, but not as easily beyond them.
However, while the term ‘relational boilerplate’ may be well suited to describe terms
that can be easily modified, it may be inaccurate to describe the terms that cannot be easily
modified. I submit that the term ‘regulatory’ is better suited for that purpose because it
emphasizes (i) that there is a limit to deviation from those terms and (ii) that limit is set
not by the party with greater bargaining power, but rather by the market, with the help of
ISDA as the preeminent industry association in OTC derivatives markets.
There are several ways in which ISDA can help impose such limits. First, ISDA uses its
persuasive authority to encourage the users to adhere to the rules and specific meaning of
those rules. As the preeminent global industry association for OTC derivatives markets,
ISDA enjoys a considerable level of authority, and there is some evidence that market par-
ticipants tend to follow ISDA’s recommendations. The widespread adoption of ISDA’s
protocols is an excellent example of market participants’ willingness to follow ISDA’s rec-
ommendation concerning certain amendments of ISDA’s documentation.
The legal mechanics of protocol implementation is a second and an even more striking
example of how ISDA can help the market impose limitations on the ability of the users of
its documentation to deviate from the MA. While market participants are free to decide
not to adhere to the amendment protocols, their failure to do that could limit the scope of
counterparties willing to trade with them on alternative terms or, at the very least, increase
the cost of such trades. Hence, the use of protocols further strengthens the case for the
conceptualization of the contractual architecture developed by ISDA as a de facto regula-
tory structure.
The third element constitutive of ISDA’s contractual architecture’s regulatory structure
is the role of courts in the architecture of enforcement of the MA. Indeed, one of the prin-
cipal objections that could be raised against a conception of regulatory contracts is that
Table 1. Relational and regulatory elements of the contractual architecture of OTC derivatives
markets
Relational Regulatory
MA (provisions that can be easily modified
through the Schedule)
MA (provisions that cannot be easily modi-




17 Golden (n 2).
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they do not have an inherent enforcement mechanism. Neither the distinction between
regulatory and relational terms nor the amendment protocol mechanism gives ISDA a
role in enforcement per se even though ISDA members have the real capability to deter-
mine the meaning of certain of its terms through the Credit Determinations Committees
(CDCs).18 ISDA has, in recent years, created an arbitration mechanism as well.
That view, however, disregards the role of courts. Courts are the critical element of en-
forcement of any regulation, whether public or private.19 Contract scholars recognize that
implicitly when discussing the MA. They argue that courts should follow the plain mean-
ing of the contract’s language and only give the intention of the parties a secondary con-
sideration.20 That is because the language of the contract is believed to capture the
expectations of the market accurately. If these expectations are disappointed, the argument
goes, market participants will lose the incentives to rely on boilerplate. As a result, the
beneficial economic properties of boilerplate, such as transaction cost reductions and vari-
ous positive externalities, could be lost.
If courts were to follow the plain meaning rule of contract interpretation, the users’
ability to deviate from the contract would be limited. There is evidence that courts do
apply that rule, thereby enforcing such limitations.21 Given these limitations, financial
boilerplate does operate like a statute (using the terminology derived from the influential
article Contracts as Statue by Stephen Choi and Mitu Gulati), or, consistently, with the ter-
minology used in this article, regulation. In other words, the case for the plain meaning or
textual interpretation of financial boilerplate amounts to an explicit recognition that con-
tracts can have the structure of regulation.
The function of a regulatory contract
Contracts can also assume the function of regulation whenever they seek to address a prob-
lem that is not merely a transactional problem (such as transaction costs), but also a mar-
ket problem (such as negative externalities). Contracts are frequently said to govern
transactions whenever they seek to optimize transactions, but they can also be said to
regulate markets whenever they seek to optimize markets. Contracts are more likely to op-
timize markets when industry associations design them because of the potentially broader
functional outlook of industry associations as compared with the outlook of, say, law
firms.22
18 The CDCs are composed of market participants and while ISDA has in the past facilitated certain administrative functions of
the CDC, in 2018 the secretariat function was assigned to a third party— DC Administration Services, Inc.
19 A Shleifer, ‘Understanding Regulation’ (2005) 11 Eur Fin Management 439.
20 Choi and Gulati (n 2), Collins (n 2), Golden (n 2).
21 For example, in Lehman Bros Intl (Europe) v AG Fin Prods, Inc, 2018 NY Misc LEXIS 2974, 2018 NY Slip Op 51100(U), the
Court noted that the ISDA Master Agreement must be read ‘in light of its purpose, which is to promote legal certainty and predict-
ability or market stability when applied to termination of a diverse array of derivative transactions in global markets. For a discus-
sion of the case, see R Finn, ‘P.R.I.M.E. Finance Case Summary: Lehman Bros Intl. (Europe) v. AG Fin. Prods., Inc., 2018’
<https://primefinancedisputes.org/news/p-r-i-m-e-finance-case-summary-lehman-bros-intl-europe-v-ag-fin-prods-inc-2018>
accessed 7 June 2020. Incidentally, as Finn notes, in making that statement the court relied on the ISDA Brief of Amicus Curiae in
Lehman Bros Holdings v Intel Corp (In re Lehman Bros Holdings), 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 3991 at *40].
22 KE Davis, ‘Contracts as Technology’ (2013) 88 New York Univ L Rev 83.
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The design of the MA incorporates several provisions, which determine not only the
economic properties of transactions but also the efficiency and safety of the OTC deriva-
tives markets. The first that comes to mind is, of course, the close-out netting provision.23
The problem the provision was designed to address was systemic risk. Systemic risk is
commonly defined as the risk of adverse consequences of an institutional default for the fi-
nancial system as a whole.24 Since OTC derivatives markets are dominated by market-
making dealers, the risk that such an institution’s failure will have systemic consequences
was deemed high.
The close-out netting provision sought to address this problem by allowing the non-
defaulting counterparties to terminate their contracts with a defaulting institution. The
enforceability of the provision relied on exemptions from bankruptcy law for OTC deriva-
tives market participants. Legislators worldwide have granted such exemptions to OTC
derivatives market participants based on the systemic risk argument.25
The second example of a provision with implications for optimization of the OTC
derivatives markets that I will discuss in this article is the self-interest provision in CDS.26
The provision is a less obvious choice for such discussion than close-out netting because it
was not designed with market problems in mind. The provision explicitly allows the par-
ties to engage in transactions involving the underlying referenced asset, including ‘any ac-
tion which might constitute or give rise to a Credit Event’. Nevertheless, the self-interest
provision’s regulatory function became apparent in recent years as the opportunistic prac-
tice of manufactured defaults attracted regulatory scrutiny. At that point, market partici-
pants and regulators alike called for a change to the design of the self-interest provision to
preserve the integrity of the markets.27
A cursory overview of the two regulatory provisions of ISDA’s documentation identi-
fied above shows that contracts’ regulatory function is effectively enabled by private law—
bankruptcy and contract law—which render ISDA’s documentation enforceable. In this
way, regulation through contract can exist even in the absence of public regulation or in
cases where the scope of applicability of public regulation is not straightforward for legal
reasons. This is why the interpretation of regulatory contracts, such as the MA, can play
an important role in facilitating the achievement of the objectives of the regulatory frame-
work applicable to the markets in which the MA is used as a regulatory instrument. The
key issue, of course, is to understand what those objectives are.
23 ISDA MA, s 6 (Early Termination; Close-Out Netting).
24 HS Scott, ‘The Reduction of Systemic Risk in the United States Financial System’ (2010) 33 Harv JL & Pub Policy. 671.
25 Since the early 1990s the US Bankruptcy Code provided for such a safe harbour. See 11 USC Code s 362(b)(27). Outside of
the USA, ISDA has lobbied national governments and competent authorities on the desirability of netting, especially close-out net-
ting. In 1996 ISDA released the version of the Model Netting Act (MNA) in order to facilitate recognition of close-out netting
across the world. Subsequent versions of the MNA have been released in 2002, 2006 and, most recently, in 2018. ISDA also com-
missions legal opinions covering enforceability of close-out netting, which are available to its members.
26 ISDA 2014 CD, s 11.1(b)(iii).
27 Benjamin Bain, ‘Wall Street’s Shady Practice of Triggering Bond Defaults Draws Scrutiny From Regulators’ Bloomberg.com
(24 June 2019) <bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-24/manufactured-credit-defaults-draw-focus-of-u-s-u-k-regulators?sref¼
p81GN7r3> accessed 4 June 2020.
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ISDA may have its objectives, and public regulators may have their own. Furthermore,
there could be various groups of public regulators who may have an interest in the regula-
tory outcome. While the working assumption should be that those objectives are not in-
consistent,28 inconsistencies could arise, as they have in the context of manufactured
defaults. In the process of contractual interpretation, courts may sometimes be called to
resolve those inconsistencies and they will exercise a considerable amount of discretion in
doing so.
In this context, contractual interpretation may entail choices that are informed not
only by purely economic considerations but also by considerations of the political econ-
omy of regulation—who should regulate what and how? Suppose ISDA, through its docu-
mentation, seeks to improve the efficiency of transactions and steer the users of the
contract towards specific behaviour. In that case, this can have distributive implications,
for example, in terms of the allocation of risks.29 Suppose further the allocation of those
risks seems, in aggregate, problematic from a public policy standpoint. In that case, it is
only appropriate for a court to point that out and even solve that problem to the extent le-
gally possible.
Regulatory contracts: a conceptual framework
To summarize, a contract should be viewed as regulatory when (i) a large number of mar-
ket participants uses that contract to document their transactions, (ii) their ability to devi-
ate from the contract is limited and (iii) the contract itself (or parts thereof) is designed
with market problems (such as negative externalities) rather than transactional problems
(such as transaction costs) in mind. While the first element is a condition necessary for a
contract to regulate a market, as opposed to transactions, the second and third conditions
are generally consistent with the economic understanding of the regulatory, respectively,
structure and function of regulation. In the next section, I discuss the exact parameters of
the MA as a regulatory contract.
3. ISDA MA as a regulatory contract
Regulatory contracts: structural features
The principal structural feature of a regulatory contract is that the contract users are con-
strained or limited in their ability to deviate from it. The previous section identified three
principal institutional sources of such limitations:
1. the regulatory and relational features of the contractual architecture,
28 ISDA’s marketing slogan is ‘safe, efficient markets’, which would be aligned with the objectives of OTC derivatives market reg-
ulators. ISDA’s stated objective ‘to promote the development and maintenance of sound risk management’ also points to an over-
lap with the objectives of public regulation. ISDA, Bylaws, art II, clause (f).
29 Anna Gelpern was to my knowledge the first to make that point. As she noted, ‘contract scholars often ask what trade groups
do for contracts—how they improve drafting, respond to legal shocks, and resolve interpretation disputes. Reflecting back on the
role that contracts play in constituting and motivating industry groups is different. This line of inquiry goes to group incentives,
decision-making, legitimacy, and authority, and in turn helps contextualize the form and content of the contract.’ Gelpern (n 16).
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2. the multilateral amendment mechanism of the contract, and
3. the design of the architecture of enforcement of the contract.
Market participants could, in principle, seek to overcome those limitations by not using
the MA. But while this is technically possible, reliance on the MA is often a de facto pre-
condition of market access, particularly in the context of access to OTC derivatives mar-
kets in the USA and the UK. The OTC derivatives markets in the USA and the UK are
made by broker-dealers who are nowadays unlikely to enter into a transaction without the
MA being executed.30 If an OTC derivatives trade is entered into in connection with a cap-
ital markets financing, the documentation governing the capital markets portion of the
deal also typically stipulates that the OTC derivatives trade must be on the terms of the
MA. Thus, in practice, market participants have little choice other than to go with the
MA. What are the consequences of that choice for the definition of their legal rights?
Contract design
As noted above, some aspects of the contractual architecture developed by ISDA are regu-
latory in the sense that they are of a ‘one-size-fits-all’ type and cannot be easily adapted or
customized by individual users. Other elements are relational in the sense that they can.
The emergence of the regulatory and relational features of the contractual architecture can
be traced back to the 1987 Interest Rate and Currency Exchange Agreement, the predeces-
sor of the MA, which introduced a structural separation of the regulatory provisions and
the relational provisions by publishing a pre-printed form of the MA and, separately,
defining the scope of provisions of the MA that could be changed in the Schedule.31 By
doing that, ISDA effectively designated a set of mandatory provisions that cannot be easily
deviated from pertaining primarily to counterparty credit risk.
In contrast, the provisions that can be easily deviated from operate as defaults—they
can be deviated from but only if the parties have made their alternative choices explicit;
otherwise, they would apply without change. This is reflected, for example, in the language
of a form of Confirmation describing individual transactions, which states that ‘[it] evi-
dences a complete and binding agreement’ and, further, that until the MA is executed the
Confirmation ‘shall supplement, form part of, and be subject to, an agreement in the form
of the 1992 MA’. Thus, even if the MA had not been negotiated at the time that parties
have entered into the transaction, the pre-printed form of the MA would govern any and
all transactions between the parties.32
30 While this would happen on occasion prior to the GFC when many transactions were concluded without the MA in reliance
on the so-called long-form Confirmations, nowadays, as Paul Harding notes ‘many banks will not trade with a counterparty, par-
ticularly an unrated one, unless they have signed the MA first. This, of course, reduced ISDA backlogs where a deal has already
been done but tends to infuriate traders who cannot understand why it should take so long to negotiate a MA’ Harding (n 12).
31 As Harding notes, many banks compose a general Schedule and base variants for specific entities (eg corporates, building soci-
eties, pension funds trustees and hedge funds) upon it. ibid at 421. The changes can be substantial and many banks have their own
extensive schedules for different types of products or clients.
32 Credit Suisse Financial Products v Societe Generale d’Enterprises [1997] CLC 168; 7E Ecommunications Ltd v Vertex
Antennentdink Gmbh [2007] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 411; Caylon v Wytwornia Sprzetu Komunikacyjnego PZL Swidnik SA [2009] 2 All ER
(Comm) 603. See also S Firth, Derivatives: Law and Practice (2003).
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Finally, the MA’s contractual architecture also includes some optional provisions,
which will apply only if the parties specifically include them in the MA. Optional
provisions are also relational and can be included in the MA as appropriate.
The ‘Additional Representations’ incorporated into the Schedule are an example of an
optional provision.
Amendment protocols
The MA’s multilateral amendment mechanism is the second institutional source of
limitation on the users’ ability to deviate from the MA. While historically, ISDA intro-
duced significant amendments through a new version of the MA, in the last two deca-
des, ISDA developed a multilateral mechanism to amend the documentation—the
protocol mechanism.33 As ISDA notes, ‘[t]he benefit to an adhering party to a protocol
is that it eliminates the necessity for costly and time-consuming bilateral negotia-
tions’.34 Instead, market participants are asked to sign on to a multilateral contract
under which all of their past and future agreements with counterparties who have also
adhered to the relevant protocol will be affected. ‘Rather than bilaterally agreeing to a
set of amendments (the combination of which will be specific to the client), clients will
adhere to an ISDA protocol, agreeing to contractual amendments published by ISDA
and elected on the system.’35 As such, the protocols establish a contractual link between
virtually all market participants. But again, that is only true of the market participants
who have adhered to the relevant protocols.
Interpretation, arbitration and enforcement
While ISDA does not itself enforce the MA, it has, over time, developed mechanisms to fa-
cilitate its enforcement—the CDCs and arbitration. The CDCs facilitate enforcement by
determining if events triggering actions under the MA or related documentation have
occurred.36 CDCs are not arbitral institutions. Arbitration has, notably, been long missing
33 The 1998 ISDA EMU Protocol addressing issues arising in relation to introduction of the euro was the first one developed by
ISDA. ISDA, EMU Protocol (6 May 1998), available at <http://www.isda.org/protocol/fprot95.pdf> accessed 13 September 2019.
34 ISDA, About ISDA Protocols, <http://www2.isda.org/functional-areas/protocol-management/about-isda-protocols> accessed
13 September 2019. And further,
‘[m]arket participants who adhered to an ISDA protocol in recent years are familiar with a process that involved submitting signed
and conformed copies of an adherence letter to a designated email address. A new process was established in August 2012, when
ISDA, in an effort to provide a more streamlined and efficient method, developed a technical solution to further automate adher-
ence. The adhering party will still need to provide a letter signed by an authorized signatory in order to validate the adherence, but
the new process will make this easier and will allow that adhering party to monitor the status of that adherence from the submission
stage to the approval stage.’
35 ISDA Dodd–Frank Documentation Initiative and August 2012 Dodd–Frank Protocol FAQ (13 August 2012).
‘Unlike with previous ISDA protocols where amendments were effected solely with delivery of an adherence letter by each party to
the underlying document to be amended (i.e., a master agreement), the DF protocol included additional bilateral delivery require-
ments in order to effectuate the amendments . . Each party that submits an Adherence Letter must also deliver a completed Protocol
Questionnaire to each relevant counterparty for the amendments to be effective. As a result of these additional bilateral delivery
requirements, ISDA together with Markit have developed a technology-based solution to automate the information-gathering pro-
cess and provide sharing of submitted data and documents to permissioned counterparties.’
36 Anna Gelpern and Mitu Gulat discuss one of the more interesting cases, in which ISDA has made such a determination—the
case of the Greek sovereign debt restructuring in the early 2010s. A Gelpern & M Gulati, ‘CDS Zombies’ (2012) 13 Eur Busi Org
LR 347.
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from the ISDA regime. As Peter Werner, a senior legal counsel at ISDA noted, arguably,
this is because ISDA emerged from the sell-side, and there was no need for it. As it started
to encompass a broader membership base issues started to arise.37 In 2013, ISDA pub-
lished model arbitration clauses for use with the MA.38
Neither the CDCs nor arbitration are per se enforcement mechanisms, but the MA can
be enforced through courts. ISDA seeks to shape the enforcement outcomes either by lob-
bying for changes in the law that would ensure those outcomes or intervening as amicus
curiae in significant litigation.39 There is evidence that courts attach considerable weight
to the arguments made through ISDA’s interventions.40
These non-judicial and judicial mechanisms of enforcement constitute a third source of
institutional limitations on the ability of the users of the MA to deviate. Together with the
design of regulatory and relational terms and the multilateral amendment mechanism,
these three sources of institutional limitations on the ability of the users of the MA to devi-
ate are jointly constitutive of the regulatory structure of the MA. In other words, they
speak to the institutional limits of market participants to deviate from the rules set out by
ISDA.
Regulatory contracts: functional features
We can now turn to the principal functional feature of regulatory contracts. The concep-
tion of regulatory contracts advanced in this article envisages that regulatory contracts will
be designed with market problems (such as negative externalities) rather than transaction-
al problems (such as transaction costs) in mind. While transaction cost reduction is an im-
portant design principle that appears to have informed ISDA’s efforts over the years, it is
apparent that in some cases, the design of the MA creates solutions to both transactional
problems and market problems. For example, the close-out netting provisions of the MA
provide a solution to the transactional problem of counterparty risk, but also the market
problem of systemic risk. Furthermore, the self-interest provision of the CDs is a solution
to the transactional problem of conflicts of interest, but also to the market problem of
market integrity.
Systemic risk
I have discussed the substance of the close-out netting above. I have also noted that
exemptions from automatic stays in bankruptcy law were required for the close-out
37 King and Wood Mallesons, The ISDA-fication of arbitration (14 August 2014) <http://www.kwm.com/en/uk/knowledge/
insights/the-isda-fication-of-arbitration-an-interview-with-peter-werner-20140814> accessed 20 February 2020.
38 As the ISDA Arbitration Guide notes,
‘The clauses have been drafted primarily with cross-border transactions in mind and based upon member feedback. In particular,
the choices of seats and arbitral institutions have been determined on the basis of members’ comments as to which to prioritise; in-
clusion in this Guide is not an endorsement of these seats and institutions to the exclusion of others, and parties are, of course, free
to choose other seats and rules if they wish.’ ISDA Arbitration Guide (2013) s 3.4.
39 ISDA’s website contains an archive of all of the amicus curiae briefs submitted by ISDA. <https://www.isda.org/category/legal/
amicus-briefs> accessed 4 June 2020.
40 See (n 20).
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netting provisions to work. As discussed above, those exemptions were granted based on
the recognition that the failure of a large derivatives market participant could have system-
ic effects. The combination of close-out netting and the exemptions from automatic stay
created the regulatory function of the MA—systemic risk regulation.
Over the years, several prominent bankruptcy scholars questioned the validity of the
systemic risk argument in favour of the exemptions and (indirectly) the MA’s role in sys-
temic risk regulation.41 First, they argued that close-out netting benefits OTC derivatives
users at the expense of other creditors even without any systemic risk threats. Secondly,
the benefits of close-out netting may attract market participants to OTC derivatives trad-
ing, leading to a concentration of financial institutions on that can kind of activity and
thereby increase systemic risk. Thirdly, close-out netting can encourage runs on financial
institutions that find themselves in financial difficulties.
The GFC validated these counterarguments, at least to some extent.42 For example, in
the years leading up to the crisis, the American Insurance Group (AIG) became a signifi-
cant player in the market for CDS and faced a run by its most significant CDS counter-
party, Goldman Sachs. The run started in early 2007 when Goldman issued a collateral call
to AIG under the CDS as a result of the decrease in the value of the collateral provided by
AIG. AIG faced difficulties in meeting its counterparty’s demand. The transaction was
eventually settled between the parties. However, due to the collateral calls, AIG’s liquidity
position became so dire at a certain point that the US Department of Treasury decided to
intervene by effectively ‘bailing-out’ AIG.
Regulators in the USA took note and, in the wake of the financial crisis, developed a
special resolution regime that, among other things, temporarily stayed the exercise of the
close-out netting rights under the MA to give resolution authorities time to take actions to
stabilize a failing financial institution.43 While such stays were already part of the banking
regulation,44 they did not apply to other types of financial institutions, such as insurance
companies. In the USA, Title II of the Dodd–Frank Act (DF Act) provides for the
41 RR Bliss and GG Kaufman, ‘Derivatives and Systemic Risk: Netting, Collateral, and Closeout’ (2006) 2 J Fin Stability 1, 55; FR
Edwards and ER Morrison, ‘Derivatives and the Bankruptcy Code: Why the Special Treatment?’ (2005) 22 Yale J Reg 91.
42 D Skeel and T Jackson, ‘Transaction Consistency and the New Finance in Bankruptcy’ (2012) 112 Columb LR 152, 166.
43 In the aftermath of the GFC, several prominent international bodies and organizations, such as the Basel Committee for
Banking Supervision (BCBS), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the International
Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) issued recommendations pertaining to the proper role of close-out net-
ting. In general, the recommendations advocated for the use of risk mitigation mechanisms, such as close-out netting, provided
they do not hamper effective implementation of resolution measures. In 2010, the BCBS adopted the Report and Recommendations
of the Cross-border Bank Resolution Group, which included Recommendation 8 pertaining to close-out netting. <https://www.bis.
org/publ/bcbs169.pdf> accessed 4 June 2020. That same year, the IMF published a document, Resolution of Cross-Border Banks—A
Proposed Framework for Enhanced Coordination, which included Recommendation 9 pertaining to close-out netting. <https://
www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2010/061110.pdf> accessed 4 June 2020. In 2011, the FSB published a document titled Key
Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions, which included paragraph (4.1) related to close-out netting.
<https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_111104cc.pdf?page_moved¼1> accessed 4 June 2020. In 2013, the UNIDROIT
Governing Council adopted the Principles on the Operation of Close-out Netting Provisions. <https://www.unidroit.org/english/prin
ciples/netting/netting-principles2013-e.pdf> accessed 4 June 2020.
44 Under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation has priority in time to determine the
disposition of banking assets before counterparties can liquidate contracts. Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950, 12 USC s 11
(e)(8).
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mechanics of curtailment of those rights for a broad spectrum of systematically important
financial institutions.45
While prima facie, the mechanics seemed to resolve the problem, there remained ques-
tions about the effectiveness of the DF Act mechanics, mainly when dealing with cross-
border transactions. The mechanics mandated by the DF Act would apply to a US entity
such as AIG. However, questions remained about the foreign counterparties of US entities.
To the extent that they have not enacted such protections, the efforts of US authorities
could be impeded. As Scott O’Malia, ISDA’s CEO put it,
[i]f a US financial group enters resolution, then Dodd-Frank would apply and a stay would be
imposed on terminations by its derivatives counterparties at least, those subject to US law. If that
US company has traded with a UK counterparty under English law, however, then there is some
doubt as to whether the stay would apply, potentially impeding the efforts of the US resolution au-
thority to deal with the situation.46
One possible way to address the problem was to have similar stays imposed on deriva-
tives in those jurisdictions. However, the concern was that this could prove to be imprac-
ticable as changes in the law of that kind can take a long time.
Another possibility was to have financial institutions agree between themselves that
they will stay the exercise of their close-out netting rights under the MA in cases where the
defaulting counterparty is a financial institution subject to resolution by the competent
authorities. Accordingly, ISDA working with the 18 largest banks and the Financial
Stability Board developed the Resolution Stay Protocol that will
impose a stay on cross-default and early termination rights within standard ISDA derivatives con-
tracts between G-18 firms in the event one of them is subject to resolution action in its jurisdic-
tion. The stay is intended to give regulators time to facilitate an orderly resolution of a troubled
bank.47
The Resolution Stay Protocol transformed the close-out mechanism provided for under
the MA through coordinated efforts of ISDA and public regulators into an explicit regula-
tory mechanism embedded in a contract. The problem was solved through a contract ra-
ther than public regulation because it was easier to implement the regulatory solution
through a contract on a transnational basis. The argument could be made that a solution
of convenience for regulators should not be regarded as a template for the regulatory pro-
cess. The solution amounted to forcing parties to agree to something contractually that
regulators felt would take too long or be too difficult to achieve through legislation around
the world. The effectiveness of the solution also remains to be seen. Nevertheless, the
45 ibid s 210. For a good discussion of the role of the FDIC in the resolution of financial institutions, see Cleary Gottlieb,
Qualified Financial Contracts and Netting Under U.S. Insolvency Laws (April 2017) < https://www.clearygottlieb.com/-/media/or
ganize-archive/cgsh/files/2017/publications/qualified-financial-contracts-and-netting-under-us-insolvency-laws.pdf> accessed 8
June 2020.
46 S O’Malia, ‘Comment: Solving the too-Big-to-Fail PUZZLE’, Financial Times (24 October 2014).
47 ISDA, Major Banks Agree to Sign ISDA Resolution Stay Protocol (14 October 2014) <http://www2.isda.org/news/major-banks-
agree-to-sign-isda-resolution-stay-protocol> accessed 27 February 2018.
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Resolution Stay episode tells us something important about the role the MA now occupies
in the broader regulatory architecture of OTC derivatives markets. That role is par excel-
lence, a regulatory one.
Market integrity
I now turn to the self-interest provision and its implications for the integrity of the OTC
derivatives markets. Gina-Gail Fletcher recently offered a helpful conceptualization of
market integrity as encompassing the concepts of market fairness, the absence of market
abuse and the protection of investors.48 As she notes, ‘it is an essential characteristic of a
well-functioning market, as investors are only likely to participate to the extent they be-
lieve the markets are fair and not stacked against them. If, on the other hand, investors be-
lieve the markets to be rigged they are unlikely to enter the markets or, should they enter,
they will discount the value of all transactions.’49
Manufactured defaults are a good example of a market practice undermining market
integrity. In recent years a series of stories has been published in the financial press discus-
sing the practice of CDS holders prompting the reference entities to trigger bond defaults
in situations in which the handsome pay-out under the CDS would allow the CDS holder
to compensate the reference entity for its trouble. Perhaps the most notable case involved
Hovnanian, a US-based house builder, and a Blackstone owned hedge fund GSO. As the
Financial Times reported, in 2018 Hovnanian agreed to default on some of its debt in ex-
change for favourable financing from GSO.50
The deal stirred up market controversy. Solus Alternative Asset Management LP
(Solus), one of the main protection sellers on Hovnanian’s CDSs, unsuccessfully lob-
bied ISDA to issue a ‘clarification’ of its rules that would prevent GSO’s trade from suc-
ceeding.51 Solus was successful, however, in prompting the Board of ISDA to issue a
statement.52 In the statement, dated 11 April 2018, ISDA’s Board made a note of the
regulatory context of the DF Act and relevant anti-manipulation and anti-fraud laws
and stated that ‘narrowly tailored defaults, those that are designed to result in CDS pay-
ments that do not reflect the creditworthiness of the underlying corporate borrower
(the reference entity in the CDS), could negatively impact the efficiency, reliability and
fairness of the overall CDS market.’ The Board instructed ISDA staff to consult with
market participants and advise the Board whether amendments to the CDs should be
considered. Shortly thereafter, on 24 April 2018, the US Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) also issued a statement, in which it suggested that
48 GG Fletcher, ‘Legitimate yet Manipulative: The Conundrum of Open-Market Manipulation’ (2018) 68 Duke LJ 479.
49 Fletcher (n 4) 1114.
50 Joe Rennison, ‘Hovnanian Misses Bond Payment in Controversial “Manufactured Default”’, Financial Times (2 May 2018)
<https://www.ft.com/content/56c729b4-4da4-11e8-8a8e-22951a2d8493> accessed 4 June 2020.
51 For an excellent discussion of the saga around Hovnanian’s manufactured default, see RK Rasmussen and M Simkovic,
‘Bounties for Errors: Market Testing Contracts’ (2020) 10 Harv B LR 118.
52 ISDA Board Statement on Narrowly Tailored Credit Events, 11 April 2018 <https://www.isda.org/a/6UmEE/ISDA-Board-
Statement-on-Narrowly-Tailored-Credit-Events.pdf> accessed 8 June 2020.
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‘[m]anufactured credit events may constitute market manipulation and may severely
damage the integrity of the CDS market’.53
On 6 March 2019, ISDA circulated the first proposed changes to the standard CDS con-
tract.54 Later, in June 2019, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the CFTC
and the UK Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) released a joint statement on opportunis-
tic strategies in the credit derivatives markets.55 The statement noted that the pursuit of
manufactured defaults ‘adversely affect[s] the integrity, confidence and reputation of the
credit derivatives markets, as well as markets more generally. These opportunistic strat-
egies raise various issues under securities, derivatives, conduct and antifraud laws, as well
as public policy concern.’ However, the statement stopped short of announcing any direct
actions by the agencies. Instead, the agencies appear to have implicitly delegated the solu-
tion of the problem to ISDA.
Shortly after the publication of the joint statement by the agencies, in August 2019,
ISDA published the final version of the Narrowly Tailored Credit Event Supplement to
the 2014 ISDA CD (the NTCE Supplement).56 In the NTCE Supplement, ISDA expanded
the definition of ‘Failure to Pay’ under the MA by excluding from the scope of the defin-
ition failures that do not ‘directly or indirectly either result from or result in a deterior-
ation in the creditworthiness or financial condition of the Reference Entity’.57 Pursuant to
the NTCE Supplement, the CDCs are responsible for making the determination of
whether or not an event constitutes a ‘Failure to Pay’.58 Crucially, in making its determin-
ation, the CDC is allowed to rely on various external factors a non-exhaustive list of which
is included in the NTCE supplement.59 Through the NTCE Supplement, the regulatory
function of ISDA’s documentation has been expanded to incorporate market integrity-
related considerations.
4. The regulatory context in textual interpretation
What are the implications of the recognition of the regulatory function of contracts for
their interpretation? I have suggested earlier that deference to the plain meaning of a regu-
latory contract may be warranted as long as that meaning is not inconsistent with the
objectives of the regulatory framework applicable to the market in which the contract is
53 Statement on Manufactured Credit Events by CFTC Divisions of Clearing and Risk, Market Oversight, and Swap Dealer and
Intermediary Oversight, US CFTC (April 24, 2018), <https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/-divisionsstatement042418>
accessed 6 June 2020.
54 ISDA, Proposed Amendments to the 2014 ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions Relating to Narrowly Tailored Credit Events, 6
March 2019 < https://www.isda.org/a/CKeME/20190320-NTCE-consultation-doc-complete.pdf> accessed 8 June 2020.
55 US Commodity Futures Trading Commission Chairman J Christopher Giancarlo, US Securities and Exchange Commission
Chairman Jay Clayton, and UK Financial Conduct Authority Chief Executive Andrew Bailey, Joint statement on opportunistic strat-
egies in the credit derivatives markets (24 June 2019) <https://www.fca.org.uk/news/statements/joint-statement-opportunistic-strat
egies-credit-derivatives-markets> accessed 4 June 2020.
56 ISDA, 2019 Narrowly Tailored Credit Event Supplement to the 2014 ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions (15 July 2019 < https://
www.isda.org/a/KDqME/Final-NTCE-Supplement.pdf> accessed 8 June 2020.
57 NTCE Supplement, s 2.
58 Ibid s 3, s 1.5.
59 Ibid s 3, s 1.10.
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used as a regulatory instrument. Needless to say, when the plain meaning of the regulatory
contract is blatantly inconsistent with that regulatory framework, the regulatory frame-
work will prevail over the plain meaning of the contract. However, in many cases, courts
exercise a certain amount of discretion in determining whether the regulatory framework
is applicable at all. When they determine that it is not, the regulatory function of contracts
is enabled by the legal frameworks of private law. This section reviews a sample of case law
to illustrate how courts exercise that discretion and whether their exercise of that discre-
tion is broadly consistent with the rule of contractual interpretation for regulatory con-
tracts proposed in this article.
Systemic risk considerations
Consider first a much-discussed series of cases in which New York and English courts
sought to reconcile the meaning of the close-out netting provision with its purported as-
piration to regulate systemic risk with the doctrinal requirements of bankruptcy law. The
cases arose from lawsuits initiated by the estate of the failed investment bank Lehman
Brothers against certain of its OTC derivatives counterparties who, upon Lehman’s de-
fault, decided to withhold the payments owed to Lehman consistently with a plain mean-
ing of section 2(a)(iii) of the MA. Recall that prior to the GFC the section provided that
Each obligation of each party under Section 2(a)(i) is subject to (1) the condition precedent that
no Event of Default or Potential Event of Default with respect to the other party has occurred and
is continuing.
In the first case before the US Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York
(SDNY), Judge James Peck of the SDNY ruled in favour of Lehman finding that through
its inaction, Metavante has implicitly waived its rights to terminate the contract.60 As
Ellenberg et al. note in their review of the case:
The court noted that while the Bankruptcy Code does not specify that non-defaulting counterpar-
ties must act promptly after a filing in order to rely on the protection afforded by its safe harbour
provisions, the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code establishes that Congress intended only
to shield parties to financial contracts from the systemic risk that would result from cascading
losses due to a counterparty’s bankruptcy filing. Because the degree of systemic risk that could re-
sult from a single filing diminishes over time, both this decision and existing precedent held that
the safe harbour only protects actions that are taken reasonably promptly after the filing date.61
Interestingly, in the English case Lomas v JFB Firth Rixson, based on a similar set of facts
and involving Lehman’s European estate, the English Court of Appeals (ECA) rejected
Lehman’s argument.62 The ECA observed that it was only the performance of the obliga-
tion that was being suspended, and not the obligation itself. This interpretation, the court
60 In re Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc, Case No 08-13555 et seq (JMP) (jointly administered).
61 M Ellenberg, N Shiren, L Chervokas and A Damianova (Cadwalader), ‘Same question, different outcome: s 2(a)(iii) of the
ISDA Master Agreement under English and US insolvency law’ (March 2011) 26 Butterworths J Int’l Bank and Fin L, 149, 150.
62 Lomas v JFB Firth Rixson Inc [2012] 2 All ER (Comm).
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noted, is in accordance with the express language of section 2(a)(iii), which stated that the
condition precedent to payment is to subsist for so long as the event of default or potential
event of default ‘has occurred and is continuing’ As Moller et al note, ‘the suggestion that
the suspension lasts only for a reasonable period was, according to the judge, contrary to
that express provision as to the duration of the payment suspension’.63
As they further noted,
before dealing with each of the various alternative interpretations of s.2(a)(iii) advanced by the
Joint Administrators and by the respondents, the judge referred to two general considerations in
interpreting s.2(a)(iii). The first was the need, given the widespread use of the ISDA master agree-
ment, for ‘clarity, certainty and predictability in its interpretation.’ The second concerned the lim-
ited circumstances in which an English court will find that a term is implied into a contract . . .
There is no scope for the court to find that a term is implied simply because it makes commercial
sense or even because reasonable parties to the contract would have adopted the term had it been
suggested to them. (ibid)
The judgment of the ECA stood in sharp contrast with the earlier decision of the US
bankruptcy court for the SDNY. In the English case, the ECA considered the close-out net-
ting provisions to be a purely commercial one and followed the provision’s plain meaning.
In the USA, the SDNY interpreted the provision in the light of the regulatory framework
applicable to the OTC derivatives market.64
ISDA was initially critical of the outcome in the case from the SDNY. However, subse-
quently, the ECA outcome attracted a considerable amount of criticism from some market
participants and various governmental and regulatory bodies who expressed concerns
over the uncertainty caused to the defaulting parties when section 2(a)(iii) is interpreted
in the way the ECA interpreted it. Indeed, as early as December 2009, the UK Treasury
called upon ISDA to find a solution to limit the operation of section 2(a)(iii) to a ‘reason-
able period’. ISDA proposed its first amendment in 2011, but it was only the subsequent
version published in 2014 that was adopted.65
The history of the amendment of the MA for use in relation to section 2(a)(iii) suggests
that possible inconsistencies between the plain meaning of a regulatory contract and the
legal context should ideally be resolved prospectively through coordination between pri-
vate and public regulators. Nevertheless, in some cases, courts may play a role in facilitat-
ing such coordination. That role consists of ensuring that the outcome of the
interpretation of a regulatory contract is not inconsistent with the objectives of the
63 SH Moller, ARG Nolan, HM Goldwasser, ‘Section 2(a)(iii) of the ISDA Master Agreement and Emerging Swaps
Jurisprudence in the Shadow of Lehman Brothers’ (2011) 26 J Int’l Bank L and Reg 7.
64 The safe harbour provisions of the Bankruptcy Code perform a dual function. The first function, consistent with the econom-
ic rationale of bankruptcy law, is to regulate bankruptcy priorities among various groups of creditors. The second function, un-
usual for a private law branch, is to regulate systemic risk. Bankruptcy law scholars Edward R Morrison and Mark J Roe as well as
Judge Christopher Sontchi of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware made that point and argued in their
critique of safe harbours for repurchase agreements that ‘[i]t is time for the Bankruptcy Code to get out of the business of regulat-
ing financial markets.’ ER Morrison, MJ Roe and C Sontchi, ‘Rolling Back the Repo Safe Harbors’ (2014) 69 Busin Lawyer 1016.
65 ISDA, Amendment to the ISDA Master Agreement for use in relation to Section 2(a)(iii) < isda.org/book/amendment-to-
the-isda-master-agreement-for-use-in-relation-to-section-2aiii-and-explanatory-memorandum/> accessed 8 June 2020.
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regulatory framework applicable to the market in which the contract is used as a regula-
tory instrument.
The application of the regulatory rule of contractual interpretation may be challenging
in the absence of any prior indication from regulators as to what those objectives are.
However, if those objectives are clear, as they were in the case of the close-out netting pro-
vision, there are few reasons why courts should not interpret the meaning of the regulatory
contract in the light of those objectives. This is what Judge Peck did in Metavante.
The argument could be made that the practical significance of the Metavante decision
was limited. Judge Peck held that Metavante had waived its right to terminate the contract,
but he did not mandate Metavante to make back payments—the section 2(a)(iii) condi-
tion still applied. Further, in the case, Metavante was out of the money (it owed Lehman).
Its actions may have been different if it was in the money (owing from Lehman) or even
out of the money in a two-way trade (because of fluctuations in the value of the underly-
ing asset or index).
But while the practical significance of the Metavante may not have been great, its theor-
etical significance was. The theoretical significance of the decision consisted of demon-
strating that it is possible and desirable to ensure that the plain meaning of a regulatory
contract is not inconsistent with the objectives of the regulatory framework applicable to
the market in which the contract is used as a regulatory instrument. Otherwise, the use of
that contract by market participants could undermine the achievement of those objectives,
which would be problematic from a public policy standpoint.
Market integrity considerations
There is no doubt that a regulatory interpretation of a contract takes away from market
participants some of the flexibility ensured in a strict textual interpretation. There is a dif-
ference between being able to suspend payments for a reasonable period (under the regu-
latory interpretation of section 2(a)(iii)) and indefinitely (under a strict textual
interpretation of section 2(a)(iii)). ISDA represents market participants who generally
want flexibility and this, perhaps, explains why ISDA has historically endorsed strict text-
ual interpretations of its documents. The NTCE Supplement was something of an anom-
aly in that respect. It permitted the CDCs to consider the purpose of a transaction in
determining whether a ‘Failure to Pay’ and therefore a credit event has occurred.66 While
ISDA has not abandoned the textualist approach, it has for the second time, explicitly
accounted for the regulatory context in which its contracts operate.
That shift of perspective can be easily explained and justified in line with the reasoning
presented in this article. ISDA represents market participants who generally want to be
able to use ISDA’s documents flexibly. But ISDA also represents market participants who
want efficiency and safety. The regulators made it clear that the opportunistic use of the
self-interest provision undermines the achievement of those objectives even though,
66 Fletcher (n 4) 1133 also makes this point.
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admittedly, they stopped short of taking any actions and let ISDA devise a regulatory solu-
tion which will inevitably affect contractual interpretation. That choice prompts two ques-
tions. First, is the objective of the regulatory framework applicable to the OTC derivatives
markets clear enough to warrant a regulatory interpretation of the self-interest provision?
Second, are the CDCs the most appropriate venues to make such determinations?
The answer to the first question is rather straightforward, considering the regulatory
developments discussed above. Yes, the regulatory framework applicable to the OTC
derivatives markets is clear enough to warrant a regulatory interpretation of the self-
interest provision. Regulators have indicated that the pursuit of manufactured defaults is
detrimental to the integrity, confidence and reputation of the credit derivatives markets.
As for the second question, several scholars of regulation, including myself, have in the
past made the point about the conflicted nature of CDCs.67 ISDA has taken important
steps to resolve conflicts of interest that could arise from the CDCs’ composition in the
latest version of the CDC rules.68 Nevertheless, the delegation of the task of the policing of
market integrity to the CDCs raises a more general issue about the CDCs’ proper role. The
task is regulatory in nature and there could be doubts as to whether, as currently set up,
the CDC can perform that role. Fletcher suggests that ISDA could set up a separate adjudi-
catory panel and entrust it with the task.69 Conceivably, the Panel of Recognised
International Market Experts in Finance could play that role as well. While technically
equipped for the task, each of those bodies would inevitably face the political economy
challenge that is the running theme of this article—who should regulate what and how?
Consider a recent case also discussed by Fletcher in her article, Good Hill Master Fund
LP v Deutsche Bank AG,70 in which the New York state appellate court addressed the
implications of the implied covenant of good faith on a CDS counterparty’s self-dealing
conduct under the MA given the self-interest provision. In the case, Good Hill was the
protection seller and the reference obligation was a series of residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) also held by Good Hill, which it subsequently sold to Bank of America
triggering an event of default under the CDS. Deutsche refused to return the collateral
provided by Good Hill in connection with the CDS. Good Hill sued for breach of contract
and return of the collateral. Deutsche Bank defended its actions, alleging that Good Hill
breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing under the CDS contract by
engineer[ing] [a] commercially unreasonable and untenable . . . purchase price’ for the
RMBS. The appellate court, however, disagreed with Deutsche Bank, affirming the deci-
sion of the trial court.
Fletcher summarizes the courts’ findings as follows: the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing does not impose any obligations beyond the terms of the contract and
67 Awrey (n 2); Borowicz (n 5); Fletcher (n 4).
68 ISDA, 2016 Credit Derivatives Determinations Committees Rules (20 January 2016) < https://www.cdsdeterminationscommit
tees.org/wp-content/files_mf/1453298092DC_Rules__Jan_2016_Update.pdf> accessed 8 June 2020.
69 Fletcher (n 4) 1135.
70 Good Hill Master Fund LP v Deutsche Bank AG, 146 AD 3d 632 (NY App Div 2017).
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cannot impose duties that would contradict other terms of the contract. In light of the
self-interest provision, Good Hill was permitted to both (i) enter into transactions involv-
ing the RMBS underlying the CDS, and (ii) pursue its own interests even if its actions may
be detrimental to Deutsche Bank’s interests. In concluding, the court stated that Deutsche
Bank failed to meet its burden of proving Good Hill acted in bad faith in breach of the
CDS contract.
While there is a clear commercial logic to the judgment, in my view, the case illustrates
the limitations of a strict textual interpretation in the context of a provision, which has
regulatory implications. There are good legal and economic reasons for courts to enforce
regulatory contracts in accordance with the plain meaning of their terms as long as that
meaning is not inconsistent with the objectives of the applicable regulatory framework.
However, when the plain meaning of a regulatory contract is inconsistent with those
objectives, courts should instead seek to align the meaning of the contract with those
objectives through regulatory interpretation. Otherwise, as already noted, the use of that
contract by market participants could undermine the achievement of those objectives,
which would be problematic from a public policy standpoint.
The necessary condition that has to be met for a regulatory interpretation of contracts to
be normatively justified is the identification of a clear regulatory objective and a clear under-
standing of how a more conventional, plain meaning interpretation would undermine the
achievement of those objectives. Whereas that condition may not have been met in 2017, at
the time Good Hill was decided, it was met soon thereafter, in particular following the issu-
ance by the CFTC and, later, by the CFTC together with the SEC and FCA of statements on
opportunistic strategies in the credit derivatives markets. These statements should be
regarded as the legal basis of future regulatory interpretations of the self-interest provisions
of the CDS. While the regulatory interpretation of the self-interest provision in line with
that statement would reduce the flexibility afforded by the plain meaning interpretation, it
would ultimately increase the integrity of markets and benefit market participants in the
long run, consistently with the regulatory rationale put forward by the agencies.
The judicial cost and error objections
The rule of regulatory contractual interpretation proposed here is best understood as an
extension of the plain meaning or textual rule. The regulatory rule is not a contextual rule,
even though it considers the regulatory context of the contract.71 But it is subject to some
of the same objections typically raised with respect to contextual interpretation, namely
that (i) it is costly and impractical to implement72 and (ii) likely to result in errors.73
While the cost argument is persuasive in the context of a very large number of commercial
contracts litigated in courts, the universe or regulatory contracts litigated in courts is very
71 The argument could be made that the text/context distinction may not be as analytically useful as contract scholars believe it
to be.
72 A Schwartz and RE Scott, ‘Contract Interpretation Redux’ (2010) 119 Yale LJ 926.
73 E Posner, ‘A Theory of Contract Law under Conditions of Radical Judicial Error’ (2000) 94 Northwestern Uni L Rev. 749.
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small making the cost argument less persuasive. Similarly, the impracticality objection
seems weak in cases where the regulatory objectives that inform the interpretation of a
regulatory contract are clear. A high level of clarity concerning those objectives is necessary
for a successful application of the regulatory rules of contract interpretation.
5. Conclusions
Boilerplate contracts can display relational, but also regulatory features. The conceptual
difference between the two categories of boilerplate contracts is not only in terms of the
degree of modification that is possible but also in terms of their respective functions.
While relational contracts allow the parties to optimize their transactions, regulatory con-
tracts are designed to optimize markets. Markets can be understood as aggregations of
transactions, but market problems, such as negative externalities, are different from trans-
actional problems, such as transaction costs. The ISDA MA addresses both types of prob-
lems and, in that respect, is a unique type of contract.
This article sought to capture that uniqueness by identifying the MA’s regulatory prop-
erties and proposing a rule for the interpretation of contracts with such properties. The
rule states that the outcome of the interpretation of regulatory contracts must not be in-
consistent with the objectives of the regulatory framework applicable to the market in
which the contract is used as a regulatory instrument. The reliance on that rule is norma-
tively justified in cases where the regulatory objectives are clearly defined and particularly
when the alternative outcome is to void the contract or its provision. While the regulatory
interpretation of a contract reduces the flexibility afforded by the plain meaning interpret-
ation, it can ultimately increase the efficiency and safety of markets and benefit market
participants.
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